EFFICIENT GOVERNMENTS: THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC THEORY IN OPTIMIZING PUBLIC CHOICES

Abstract

The lack of legislative technique, the high degree of abstraction and instability of the rules that allow different interpretations regarding their real purpose and the indeterminacy regarding the concept of public interest make rational and adequate decision-making difficult in the political sphere. Likewise, the law, a corollary of the Democratic State, sometimes proves to be incompatible with efficiency in public choices, precisely because it expresses the will of the majority, without taking into account the sum of the utilities resulting from these choices. Agents' decisions, in these cases, tend to be guided by opposing vectors: on the one hand, the law and current constitutional principles, including the duty of efficiency and responsibility in the management of public resources; on the other, the constant need to legitimize themselves in power, reconciling antagonistic interests in order to maximize votes in elections. It is in this context that the so-called “interest groups” emerge, the exchange of favors, undue benefits and the gradual process of commercialization of law, supported by the idea that the ruler’s “error” is justifiable in different circumstances and is, therefore, intangible and immune to liability by control bodies. The application of economic theory, based on utilitarian ethics, can contribute to reducing government failures, making the process more rational for making public choices. To achieve this, it will be necessary to reframe the concept of public interest, moving away from the traditional notion linked to the idea that democracy is always intended to meet the will of the majority. This is not an interference in political merit, but a change in perspective on the control carried out, which starts to measure the results by the level of collective utility it provides. In situations like this, the trivialization of the error can become excessively dangerous when what is at stake is the effectiveness of constitutionally foreseen rights.